#### Counterplan text: <aff actor> ought to abolish all prison institutions - they will provide amnesty for prisoners convicted of nonviolent crimes, repeal sentences for drug offenses, and replace prisons with community based rehabilitation programs. Gilmore

Related to the above is the growth of new abolitionist movements whose goals are the elimination of mass imprisonment as a method of treatment for addiction and mental illness, as an economic ameliorative, and as a method of social control -- what one scholar has termed "the carceral management of poverty" (Wacquant, 1999: 349). The connections between slavery and imprisonment have been used by abolitionists as an historical explanation and as part of a radical political strategy that questions the feasibility of "reform" as an appropriate response to prison expansion. As a leader in the creation of this new abolitionist movement, Angela Davis (1996: 26) has written, "I choose the word `abolitionist' deliberately. The 13th Amendment, when it abolished slavery, did so except for convicts. Through the prison system, the vestiges of slavery have persisted. It thus makes sense to use a word that has this historical resonance." Though some 20th-century abolitionist movements connect themselves expressly with the tradition of 19th-century abolitionists and antislavery advocates, abolitionism as defined here is the conglomerate of many local movements that express abolitionist aims indirectly through challenging the fundamental methods of the prison-industrial complex -- mandatory minimum sentences, harsh penalties for nonviolent drug offenses, and the continuous construction of prisons that goes on regardless of crime rates. Although a fully conceptualized abolitionism is starting to emerge, it may be useful to outline some of the historical antecedents to current anti-prison and antiracist movements. As prison construction and the crime frenzy continue around the U.S. (and indeed, the world) at such a dizzying pace, calls for prison abolition risk being perceived as utopian. The state, as it is currently configured in the U.S., has a primary investment in making the world safe for free trade, with domestic "stability" through state violence and brutality a key method of achieving the temporary façade of stability. In rural and urban areas crippled by the slow decline in manufacturing and skilled jobs, the punishment industry has emerged as the new jobs program, a role it plays with the military.2 In this moment, it may seem more difficult than ever to envision a state that supports humanity rather than eviscerates the possibility of freedom and health for so many of its people. Yet it is precisely now, when prisons crowd the physical and psychic landscape, that imagining abolition is most critical. Thus, the new abolitionism has arisen out of the communities most affected by the prison state -- those least able to conceptualize anything other than a transformation of the state as it is currently configured.

B is competition—obviously mutually exclusive, there are no prisons in my world.

C Solvency—CP solves the aff better—abolition is key, we must get rid of the prison industrial complex-- that’s the real root cause.

McSpadden ‘07

Angela Davis, one of the pioneers of the prison abolition movement, emphasizes that that the abolition of prison is a long-term goal that will involve a massive amount of social reform along the way, including a basic restructuring of how we as a culture perceive crime. “In order to imagine a world without prisons... a new popular vocabulary will have to replace the current language, which articulates crime and punishment in such a way that we cannot think about a society without crime except as a society in which all the criminals are imprisoned,” Davis said. “Thus, one of the first challenges is to be able to talk about the many ways in which punishment is linked to poverty, racism, sexism, homophobia and other modes of dominance.” Such a reframe, which acknowledges and takes responsibility for the social causes of crime, would lead to a re-channeling of the billions of dollars that currently go into the prison system into community-based economic resources, educational services, community forums for dispute resolution, medical and mental health care, rehabilitation systems and community services for adults and children– a conglomeration of services that would deserve the term “correctional facilities” in a way that prisons never will. Quite frankly, I am not comfortable with the fact that the society to which I belong condones an industry that promotes and spreads suffering.

No chance at turns—the AC only functions in private prisons, but the existence of private corporations in jailing causes their harms. Even if abolishing all prisons causes some harm, abolishing private prisons outweighs. Davis 11

[Angela Y. Davis](https://www.google.com/search?tbo=p&tbm=bks&q=inauthor:%22Angela+Y.+Davis%22) Seven Stories Press, Jan 4, 2011 - [Political Science](https://www.google.com/search?tbo=p&tbm=bks&q=subject:%22Political+Science%22&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0) - 128 pages

The exploitation of prison labor by private corporations is one aspect among an array of relationships linking corporations, government, [and] correctional communities, and media. These relationships constitutewhat we now call a prison industrial complex. The term “prison industrial complex was introduced by activists and scholars to contest prevailing beliefs that increased levels of crime were the root cause of mounting prison populations. Instead, they argued, prison construction and the attendant drive to fill these new structures with human bodies have been driven by ideologies of racism and the pursuit of profit. Social historian Mike Davis first used the term in relation to california’s penal system, which, he observed, already had begun in the 1990s to rival agribusiness and land development as a major economic and political force.

D Net Benefit

#### (\_\_) The irony is, though aff tries to resist the power structure in prisons, he fails to understand the greatest one is that of wages themselves. Workers sell their time and energy—they become commodities of corporations.

**Marx-** modified for gender.

Marx, Karl. “Wage Labour and Capital. Chapter 2.” Wage Labour and Capital. Web. 7 Dec. 2014.

Let us **take** any worker; for example, **a weaver. The capitalist supplies [them]** him **with the loom and yarn. The weaver applies** himself **[themself] to work, and the yarn is turned into cloth. The capitalist takes possession of the cloth and sells it for 20 shillings**, for example. Now are the wages of the weaver a share of the cloth, of the 20 shillings, of the product of the work? By no means. Long before the cloth is sold, perhaps long before it is fully woven, **the weaver has received** his **[their] wages. The capitalist**, then, **does** not **pay** his **wages** out of the money which he will obtain from the cloth, but **out of money already on hand.** Just as little **as loom and yarn are the product of the weaver** to whom they are supplied by the employer, just **so** **little are the commodities which** he **[they] receives in exchange for** his **[their] commodity – labour-power –** his **product. It is possible that the employer found no purchasers at all for the cloth.** It is possible that he did not get even the amount of the wages by its sale. It is possible that he sells it very profitably in proportion to the weaver’s wages. But all that does not concern the weaver. With a part of his [their] existing wealth, of his [their] capital, **the capitalist buys the labour-power of the weaver in exactly the same manner as**, with another part of his wealth, **he has bought the** raw material – the **yarn** – and the instrument of labour – the loom. After he has made these purchases, and among them belongs the labour-power necessary to the production of the cloth he produces only with raw materials and instruments of labour belonging to him. For our good weaver, too, is one of the instruments of labour, and being in this respect on a par with the loom, he has no more share in the product (the cloth), or in the price of the product, than the loom itself has.

“The labor” power is a form of dehumanization—they are not securing themselves but selling themselves to survive. Living wage still is a victim desperately acting to survive

Marx 2 modified for gender

Marx, Karl. “Wage Labour and Capital. Chapter 2.” Wage Labour and Capital. Web. 7 Dec. 2014.

But **the putting of labour-power into action** – i.e., the work – **is the active expression of the labourer’s own life.** And this life activity he **[they] sell**s **to another person in order to secure the necessary means of life.** His **[Their] life-activity, therefore, is but a means of securing** his **[their]** **own existence.** He works that he may keep alive. He does not count the **labour** itself as a part of his life; it **is** rather **a sacrifice of** his **[their] life. It is a commodity that** he has **[they have] auctioned off to another. The product of [their]** his **activity, therefore, is not the aim of** his **[their] activity. What [they]** he **produce**s **for** **[themselves]** himself **is not the silk** that he weaves, not the gold that he draws up the mining shaft, not the palace that he builds. **What** he **[they] produce**s **for** himself **[themselves] is wages**; and **the silk**, the gold, **and the palace are resolved for** him **[them] into a certain quantity of necessaries of life, perhaps into a cotton jacket**, into copper coins, and into a basement dwelling. **And the labourer who for 12 hours long, weaves, spins,** bores, turns, builds, shovels, breaks stone, carries hods, and so on – is this 12 hours’ weaving, spinning, boring, turning, building, shovelling, stone-breaking, regarded by him as a manifestation of life, as life? Quite the contrary. **Life for** him **[them] begins where this activity ceases, at the table, at the tavern, in bed. [They have]** The 12 hours’ work, on the other hand, has **no meaning for him *as* weaving**, spinning, boring, and so on, **but only as earnings, which enable** him **[them] to sit down at a table, to take** his **[their] seat in the tavern, and to lie down in a bed**. If the silk-worm’s object in spinning were to prolong its existence as caterpillar, it would be a perfect example of a wage-worker.

#### (\_\_) The aff’s attachment to the wage system to improve workers’ conditions entrenches capitalism

Wolff 06 – a member of the editorial board of several academic journals including *Rethinking Marxism*

(Wolff, Rick. “Anti-Slavery and Anti-Capitalism.” *Logos Journal* 5(1): 2006. <http://www.logosjournal.com/issue_5.1/wolff.htm>)

Neoclassical economic theory, among other hegemonic sets of ideas, has worked well to support and justify capitalism and undermine the appeal of Marxist economic theory. One modality of its working has been the sedimentation into the popular consciousness of the notion of “the wage.” It strikes vast numbers of people as somehow obvious, natural, and necessary that production be organized around a deal struck between a wage payer and wage receiver. And this is all the more remarkable in as much as the vast bulk of human history displays economic systems without wages (neither serfs, nor slaves, nor individuals who work alone, nor most collective work systems have used wages). Capitalism’s history is in part the history of the deepening conceptual hegemony of the wage. Thus, for example, the individual peasant or craftsperson working alone has had to be renamed a “self-employed person” to revision a non-wage production system as if it were waged. Naturalizing the wage concept works to naturalize capitalist relations of production, the employer/employee relation, not as one among alternative production systems but as somehow intrinsic to production itself. Workers, trade unions, and intellectuals often cannot imagine production without wages and hence wage payers juxtaposed to wage earners. This helps to make capitalism itself appear as necessary and eternal much as the parallel theories celebrating feudalism and slavery performed the same function for those systems of production. The naturalization of the wage system helps support the notion that the fundamental goal of workers’ organization must be to raise wages.

#### AND we have a prima facie ethical responsibility to resist capitalism—this means before their args

Zizek and Daly ‘4 Glyn Daly, senior lecturer in politics in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at University College Northampton, Conversations With Zizek, 2004, pp. 14-16

For Zizek it is imperative that we cut through this Gord­ian knot of postmodern protocol and recognize that our ethico-political responsibility is to confront the constitutive violence of today’s global capitalism and its obscene naturalization/anonymization of the millions who are subju­gated by it throughout the world. Against the standardized positions of postmodern culture — with all its pieties con­cerning ‘multiculturalist’ etiquette — Zizek is arguing for a politics that might be called ‘radically incorrect’ in the sense that it breaks with these types of positions and focuses instead on the very organizing principles of today’s social reality: the principles of global liberal capitalism. This requires some care and subtlety. For far too long, Marxism has been bedevilled by an almost fetishistic economism that has tended towards political mor­bidity. With the likes of Hilferding and Gramsci, and more recently Laclau and Mouffe, crucial theoretical advances have been made that enable the transcendence of all forms of economism. In this new context, however, Zizek argues that the problem that now presents itself is almost that of the opposite fetish. That is to say, the prohibitive anxieties surrounding the taboo of economism can function as a way of not engaging with economic reality and as a way of im­plicitly accepting the latter as a basic horizon of existence. In an ironic Freudian-Lacanian twist, the fear of economism can end up reinforcing a de facto economic necessity in respect of contemporary capitalism (i.e. the initial prohibi­tion conjures up the very thing it fears). This is not to endorse any kind of retrograde return to economism. Zizek’s point is rather that in rejecting economism we should not lose sight of the systemic power of capital in shaping the lives and destinies of humanity and our very sense of the possible. In particular we should not overlook Marx’s central insight that in order to create a uni­versal global system the forces of capitalism seek to conceal the politico-discursive violence of its construction through a kind of gentrification of that system. What is persistently denied by neo-liberals such as Rorty (1989) and Fukuyama (1992) is that the gentrification of global liberal capitalism is one whose ‘universalism’ fundamentally reproduces and depends upon a disavowed violence that excludes vast sectors of the world’s population. In this way, neo-liberal ideology attempts to naturalize capitalism by presenting its out­comes of winning and losing as if they were simply a matter of chance and sound judgement in a neutral marketplace. Capitalism does indeed create a space for a certain diver­sity, at least for the central capitalist regions, but it is neither neutral nor ideal and its price in terms of social exclusion is exorbitant. That is to say, the human cost in terms of inherent global poverty and degraded ‘life-chances’ cannot be calculated within the existing economic rationale and, in consequence, social exclusion remains mystified and name­less (viz, the patronizing reference to the ‘developing world’. And Zizek’s point is that this mystification is mag­nified through capitalism’s profound capacity to ingest its own excesses and negativity: to redirect (or misdirect) social antagonisms and to absorb them within a culture of differ­ential affirmation. Instead of Bolshevism, the tendency today is towards a kind of political boutiquism that is readily sus­tained by postmodern forms of consumerism and lifestyle. Against this Zizek argues for a new universalism whose primary ethical directive is to confront the fact that our forms of social existence are founded on exclusion on a global scale. While it is perfectly true that universalism can never become Universal (it will always require a hegemonic-par­ticular embodiment in order to have any meaning), what is novel about Zizek’s universalism is that it would not attempt to conceal this fact or to reduce the status of the abject Other to that of a ‘glitch’ in an otherwise sound matrix.